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To date, tax scholars have responded to the proliferation of so-called temporary 
or sunset tax expenditure legislation by staking claims either for or against it, focusing 
on its relative merits and shortcomings. In this Article, I argue that these positions are 
analytically incomplete.  Rather than address the underlying deficiencies in the budget 
process that have led to the preference for temporary tax provisions, the advocacy of the 
use (or non-use) of temporary provisions simply asks which type of provision will yield 
the least problematic results.   
This Article seeks to help fill a gap in the literature by focusing on remedies 
meant to address the source of many issues related to both temporary and permanent tax 
expenditure legislation.  In particular, I propose the adoption of a bundle of new budget 
rules that will work as precommitment devices to restrain lawmakers from exploiting 
weaknesses in the existing process.  I argue that these proposed rules would still give 
lawmakers the flexibility to adopt either temporary or permanent tax legislation as 
appropriate.  However, the proposed rules would help to decrease opportunities for 
budget manipulations, impose more fiscal restraint on lawmakers, achieve greater 
legislative transparency, help loosen the hold of special interest groups on lawmakers, 
and enhance legislative stability.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over fifty tax expenditure provisions in the Internal Revenue Code reside in an 
effective tax abyss—neither permanently enacted nor affirmatively repealed. 1   This 
predicament is a natural byproduct of the so-called “tax extender” legislative 
phenomenon, whereby tax expenditures are routinely enacted on a temporary basis 
(typically for one or two years).  At the end of their effective period, these provisions are 
habitually extended, sometimes retroactively. 
The proliferation of tax extender provisions is not insignificant.  It is estimated 
that the cost of tax extenders each year is approximately $54 billion, and the cost to have 
these same extenders in effect for the next ten years would cost over $930 billion.
2
  The 
growing prevalence of temporary tax legislation is primarily attributable to vagaries in 
the budget process that give tax expenditures an advantage over direct spending 
equivalents and temporary tax provisions an advantage over their permanent 
counterparts.
3
  First, the nominal cost of a tax extender is significantly reduced due to its 
purported shorter effective period, even if it is anticipated that it will be extended again 
the following year.  Moreover, providing offsets necessary to make a temporary provision 
revenue neutral is far easier than for a permanent provision.  With the ten-year budget 
window typically used for scoring legislation, lawmakers can use ten years of revenue to 
offset the cost of a single year of tax legislation rather than having to find revenue offsets 
for a full ten years.  This type of budget manipulation is in large part responsible for the 
explosion of temporary tax legislation in recent years.
4
 
It is not surprising that the rise of tax extenders has garnered significant attention 
from both legislators and academics alike.  In response to this proliferation of temporary 
legislation, scholars have come out both for and against the use of temporary provisions 
as a legitimate legislative tool.
5
  In particular, recent analysis has focused on the inherent 
                                               
1 See Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, LIST OF EXPIRING TAX PROVISIONS 2013-2024 (Jan. 10, 
2014), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4540.  On December 3, 2014 
the House of Representatives passed a bill to renew the tax extenders that expired at the end of 2013 until the 
end of 2014, when they once again will expire.  Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 H.R. 5771.   Even if 
approved by the Senate, the bill only represents  a one-year deal, and Congress will have to revisit these same 
extenders again in 2015. 
2 Molly F. Sherlock, Cong. Research Serv., TAX PROVISIONS EXPIRING IN 2013 (“TAX EXTENDERS”), 
Table 1 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43124.pdf  (estimating the cost of extending 
all of the expired provisions to 2014 at $54.2 billion and the cost of extending these same provisions 
throughout the entire 2014-2023 period at $938.3 billion). 
3 Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (2011); William Gale and 
Peter Orszag, Sunsets in the Tax Code, TAX NOTES at 115 (June 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2003/6/09useconomics%20gale/20030609.pdf 
(noting “[s]unsets are now a de facto element of fiscal policy”). 
4 Testimony before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, 112th Cong. 3-4 (June 8, 2012) (statement of Donald B. Marron), available at 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001620-tax-expirers.pdf. 
5 See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 3 at 1008 (arguing against a presumption for temporary legislation); 
Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. 
L. REV. 335, 339 (2006) (arguing that sunset provisions do not function as “good government” tools); Jacob 
E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 298 (2007) (arguing “there should be a 
presumptive preference in favor of temporary legislation”); George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, 
Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 187-94 (2009) (proposing presumption 
in favor of temporary effect legislation). 
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virtues and vices of temporary tax provisions versus their permanent counterparts.
6
  Most 
notably, George Yin argues that the “enactment of temporary-effect rather than 
permanent legislation would promote political accountability and may result in greater 
fiscal restraint.” 7   In contrast, Rebecca Kysar believes “‘pro-temporary legislation’ 
scholars understate the costs of such legislation because temporary legislation increases 
rents from interest groups, entrenches current majoritarian preferences, and produces 
planning conundrums for public and private actors alike.”8  She therefore recommends a 
“policy presumption against temporary legislation.”9 
Neither of these diametrically opposed views, however, fully addresses the 
limitations and faults of our modern day legislative budget process.  While there are 
certainly merits and drawbacks to either type of legislation, in this Article I argue that 
simply focusing the analysis on the preferable length of the tax legislation is insufficient. 
I believe that a more complete analysis can be achieved by alternatively focusing on 
determining what types of budget constraints, if any, can best achieve the goals of 
responsible legislation. In particular, this Article proposes budget reforms and explores 
how these reforms could affect the goals of fiscal restraint, transparency, adaptability, 
and resistance to capture by private interests, independent of the length of the legislation 
being used. 
In order to assess the potential impact that budgetary process constraints could 
have on the challenges presently plaguing the tax legislative process, this Article 
proposes three primary budgetary framework rules.   In particular, I argue that when tax 
expenditures are scored for budget purposes, they should be presumed to be in effect for 
the entire applicable budget window, even if they are set to expire prior to the end of the 
window.  This is consistent with what is currently required with respect to mandatory 
spending programs.
10
  Moreover, if this presumption is overcome and a temporary tax 
provision in fact is treated as such, there should be adopted a lock-step pay-as-you-go 
(PAYGO) rule which only allows qualifying offsets to be made from revenues generated 
during the term of the temporary legislation and not from the entire budget window 
period.  Lastly, I propose that there should be a baseline review of all permanently 
enacted legislation at the end of the initial ten-year budget window.  If after review the 
originally projected cost for the succeeding five-year period were more than a specified 
threshold less than the new projected costs over the same period, then Congress would 
have to find new revenue offsets for the legislation or risk sequestration.   
I believe that if implemented, these proposed rules could have significant 
consequences on the tax legislative process and help set the stage for more responsible 
tax legislation.  Specifically, these rules would yield a more nuanced use of temporary 
                                               
6 Edward Kleinbard has addressed a related, but different, issue with tax expenditure legislation—
the preference of tax expenditure legislation versus direct spending measures caused by defects in the current 
budget framework process which make tax expenditures less salient to the public.  Tax Expenditure 
Framework Legislation, USC Center in Law, Economics and Organization Research Paper No. C10-1 (April 
6, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531945. 
7 Yin, supra note 5, at 253. 
8 Kysar, supra note 3, at 1008. 
9 Id. 
10 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) currently follows guidelines in the now-expired 
provisions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which ignore sunset provisions for any legislation with annual costs 
in excess of $50 million.  CBO, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2014 TO 2024, at 14 
(2014), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45010-Outlook2014_Feb.pdf. 
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legislation that would maximize its benefits while limiting situations where it is more 
commonly abused.  These rules would impose more fiscal discipline on lawmakers while 
preserving the ability to tailor the term of legislation to specific situations—leaving in 
place lawmakers’ current ability to capitalize on benefits of both short- and long-term tax 
legislation where appropriate.  These rules would also increase fiscal transparency as to 
the true cost of legislation and prohibit the manipulation of estimates achieved by phase-
outs and other budget window manipulations.  Lastly, they would work to diminish, at 
least relative to the current system, the ability of politicians to extract rents from special 
interest groups. 
Part II of this Article discusses the current budget process for federal tax 
expenditures, and in particular explores how the current rules have helped spur the rise of 
the use of temporary tax legislation.  Part III outlines the important pros and cons of both 
temporary and permanent tax expenditure legislation, including their effects on budget 
estimations and transparency, rent extraction, and legislative stability and flexibility.  Part 
IV outlines three proposed changes to the current budgetary process.  It also describes 
both the advantageous consequences and potential criticisms of the proposals.  Part V 
concludes. 
II. BEHIND THE VEIL:  THE CURRENT BUDGET PROCESS FOR TAX 
EXPENDITURES 
A. Tax Expenditures and Tax Extenders 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Budget Act) 
defines tax expenditures as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax 
laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or 
which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.”11  
Thus, tax expenditures include any targeted tax provision that provides benefits to a 
particular subset of taxpayers.
12
  These expenditures are indistinguishable from direct 
expenditures in many respects and are often used in lieu of direct mandatory and 
discretionary spending programs.
13
  For example, if Congress wanted to encourage the 
proliferation of smartphone devices, it could enact a special tax deduction or credit for 
purchasers of smartphones.  Likewise, it could directly subsidize the manufacturers or 
distributors of smartphone devices.  In either instance, federal dollars are being used to 
try to achieve a certain policy goal.  The only difference is that one proposal uses the tax 
system and the other does not. 
The use of tax expenditures as a legislative tool has grown dramatically over the 
past two decades.
14
  Their use, however, is not always a result of a deliberate 
determination that the tax system is the best method to deliver government interventions.  
When tax laws are intended to generate immediate impacts in response to emergency 
                                               
11 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C §622(3) (1974).  The 
concept of tax expenditures was popularized by Stanley Surrey, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, 
in his book PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (Harvard University Press, 
1973). 
12 Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2012-2017 (2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4504. 
13 Thomas L. Hungerford, Cong. Research Serv., TAX EXPENDITURES AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET, at 
2 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34622.pdf; Eric J. Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending – 
Does it Make a Difference?, 53 NAT’L TAX JOURNAL 1, 361 (Sept. 2000). 
14 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Key Issues: Tax Expenditures, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/key_issues/tax_expenditures/issue_summary#t=0. 
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situations, such as the housing mortgage crisis, the use of the tax system to deploy 
government funds can be an efficient vehicle for intervention because an infrastructure is 
already in place to quickly administer the program.  For example, emergency tax 
legislation was adopted in response to Hurricane Katrina, to, among other things, provide 
extended carryback rules of certain losses incurred, provide additional exemptions for 
individuals housing displaced persons, and giving businesses tax credits for providing in-
kind housing to displaced employees.
15
  In other instances, however, tax expenditures are 
used when it is not evident there is any advantage in doing so.
16
 
As shown in Chart A below, in terms of relative magnitude, tax expenditures 
now account for nearly $1.3 trillion in federal spending each year, comprising about one 
quarter of total federal expenditures.  Tax expenditure spending now exceeds national 








The increased use of tax expenditures, generally, can in part be tied specifically 
to the increased use of tax extenders.  The term “tax extenders” refers to the subset of tax 
expenditure provisions that are passed for short-term periods (typically one or two years), 
but nevertheless are routinely extended upon their expiration.  In 2013, there were over 
ninety such provisions on the books with over fifty of them expiring on December 31, 
2013.
18
  To date, none of these provisions has been extended, although it is anticipated 
                                               
15 THE KATRINA EMERGENCY TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73 (2005); THE GULF 
OPPORTUNITY ZONE ACT OF 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135 (2005). 
16 Kleinbard, supra note 6, at 2 (“By excluding tax expenditures from the reach of most budget 
framework processes, Congress privileges tax expenditures over explicit spending… Tax expenditures in fact 
have become the preferred vehicle for delivering new spending programs — even appropriation-equivalent 
programs — in cases where the tax system offers no particular advantage as the delivery mechanism.”). 
17 Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2014-2018 (Aug. 5, 2014), available at 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=download&id=4663&chk=4663&no_html=1; Hungerford, supra 
note 13. 
18 Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation,  supra note 1.  
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that nearly all of them will be extended retroactively in some form (which is why they are 
also more aptly termed by some as the “tax expirers”).19  Together, these tax extenders 
accounted for almost $50 billion of tax expenditures for the fiscal 2013 budget year.
20
   
The quintessential tax extender is the research and experimentation (R&D) 
credit.
21
  Although the R&D credit expired on December 31, 2013 and thus is currently 
technically in legislative limbo, to-date its renewal has been all but automatic.  In fact, it 
has already been extended fifteen times since 1981.
22
  Why then has this provision not 
been permanently enacted?  Why does Congress go through the process of passing new 
R&D credit legislation every year or two when there seems to be a pervasive political 
consensus over the past thirty years in favor of granting the credit?  The simple answer is 
that the existing legislative budgeting construct makes it advantageous to do so.   
As more fully described below, when new legislation is introduced, its revenue 
effects must be scored by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Joint Committee 
on Taxation (JCT)—generally for five- and ten-year budget window periods.23  The cost 
of the proposed legislation is equal to the difference between the total expected 
government revenues without the legislation enacted (the “baseline”) and the total 
expected government revenues with the legislation enacted.
24
  This so-called “scoring” of 
legislation is intended to give legislators an estimate of the expected fiscal impact the 
proposed legislation will have on the federal budget.   
With respect to tax expenditures, when permanent legislation is proposed, the 
scoring (rightfully) assumes that the legislation will be in effect for the entire budget 
window period.  Thus, the estimated annual cost of the enacted legislation is included in 
the scoring for each year of the applicable budget window.  On the other hand, if a 
temporary provision is proposed, the scoring assumes that the provision will only remain 
in effect until its expiration date, even if it has (as in the case of the R&D credit for 
instance) been routinely renewed.  Thus, the scoring of the provision will only include the 
estimated costs of the legislation for those years during the budget window for which the 
proposed legislation is scheduled to be in effect.  So, for example, if a temporary two-
year tax expenditure is proposed, the scoring will only include costs associated with the 
provision for that two-year period. 
This budget rule for temporary tax expenditures is in direct contrast to how 
mandatory spending programs are scored.  If any proposed mandatory spending program 
contains a provision that has annual costs in excess of $50 million, it is treated as 
remaining in effect throughout the entire budget window period, even if the enabling 
                                               
19 In fact, on April 3, 2014 the Senate Finance Committee approved a bill to extend almost all of 
the expired tax provisions for two years at a projected cost of $85 billion.  EXPIRING PROVISIONS 
IMPROVEMENT REFORM AND EFFICIENCY (EXPIRE) ACT (2014), available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=43dc8d45-2748-4b19-820d-20f6c0be506d. 
20 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Paying for “Tax Extenders” Would Shrink Projected 
Increase in Debt Ratio by One-Third, (Dec. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=4058.  
21 Also referred to by some as the “R&E” credit. 




23 See H.R. Res. 5, 111th Cong. §2(j) (2009); S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. §201(a) (2007). 
24 Id. 
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statute expires prior to the end of the budget window.
25
  As a result, from a scoring 
perspective, there is no up-front advantage to enacting a temporary mandatory spending 
provision, because all non-de minimis legislation is assumed to endure even if by its 
terms it is scheduled to sunset.
26
 
The different scoring procedures for these two approaches can produce 
drastically different results.  For example, the typical two-year extension of the R&D tax 
credit is estimated to result in federal outlays of $15 billion.
27
  On the other hand, if the 
R&D credit were to either be made permanent or if it were to be scored as permanent 
(like a mandatory program would be), its ten-year cost would total nearly $100 billion.
28
  
Thus, when lawmakers are trying to comply with PAYGO principles and enact revenue 
neutral legislation, a two-year R&D credit will only need to be offset with new spending 
cuts or revenue sources totaling $15 billion rather than $100 billion.  This scoring 
advantage that tax expenditures are afforded in the budget legislative process, combined 
with other procedural advantages discussed below, have spurred the increased use of 
temporary tax provisions as a legislative tool.   
B. Budget Rules 
In order to give a more complete picture of the budgetary backdrop that governs 
this process, I will first briefly discuss the basic practices governing the budget process.  I 
will then talk about specific budgetary rules that impact the enactment of tax 
expenditures by creating biases for temporary provisions, such as the PAYGO and Byrd 
rules. 
1. Overview 
Every year Congress funds discretionary spending programs through the annual 
appropriations process.
29
  These programs include national defense, homeland security, 
transportation, agriculture, education, and general government operations.
30
  Certain rules 
and procedures govern the consideration of appropriations measures, which are under the 
jurisdiction of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.
31
 The majority of direct 
spending programs are funneled through this annual process, whereby Congress reviews 
and approves the amount of spending for these programs for the upcoming year.
32
  How 
much, if any, funding is available for a particular program during a fiscal year typically is 
dependent on how much funding it receives in the appropriations process.  
In contrast, mandatory spending programs (also known as entitlement programs) 
are not subject to this annual appropriations review.  Rather, funding is open-ended with 
the amounts paid out being a function of the number of eligible claimants and the amount 
each claimant is entitled to receive under the specific program.
33
  Once created, these 
                                               
25 See Cong. Budget Office, supra note 10. 
26 As discussed more fully below in Part IV.A.1, there is an exception to statutory PAYGO for 
emergency legislation.   
27 The Committee for a Responsible Fed. Budget, The Tax Breakdown: Tax Extenders (Mar. 26, 
2014), available at http://crfb.org/blogs/tax-break-down-tax-extenders. 
28 Id. 
29 Sandy Streeter, Cong. Research Serv., THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: AN 
INTRODUCTION, 4 (2007), available at  http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/97-684.pdf.  
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programs generally are entitled to spend whatever funds are required under their statutory 
terms and no additional spending authorization is needed from Congress.  Examples 
include Social Security, food stamps, federal retirement programs, Medicare, and 
Medicaid.
34
  These provisions are typically enacted on a permanent basis (i.e. there is no 
definitive end date for the provision expressly provided in the statute and the program 
will continue unless action is taken to repeal the existing law). 
Government spending is also achieved through a third mechanism, which does 
not fall squarely into either category: tax expenditures.  These may be enacted on a 
permanent or temporary basis, and, although subject to approval by the Congressional tax 
committees, are not subject to the annual appropriations process governing discretionary 
spending programs.
35
  Similar to entitlement programs, the funding for tax expenditures 
is generally open-ended with amounts paid out being a function of the number of eligible 
taxpayers entitled to receive particular tax benefits and the dollar value of the actual 
benefits.    
Each year, the JCT is required to furnish to the House Committee on Ways and 
Means and the Senate Committee on Finance a Tax Expenditure Budget containing 
estimates of tax expenditures over the following five-year period.
36
  These estimates are 
prepared in conjunction with the staff of the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) in the 
Department of the Treasury.
37
  Although technically an official part of the budget 
process, the Tax Expenditure Budget is solely informational and does not provide any 
constraints or directives with respect to Congressional spending.
38
  Funding for any 
particular tax expenditure program continues automatically unless legislative action is 
taken to modify or repeal the underlying statutory provision.  As a result, Congressional 
attention and focus on the budgetary impact of a given tax expenditure primarily occurs 
only upon the provision’s initial enactment. 
Although select temporary tax provisions have been regularly in use since the 
1970s, it was not until the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 
(EGTRRA) when acts of tax legislation were passed that sunsetted in their entirety.
39
  
Until 2001, most proposed tax expenditures were permanent and were therefore treated 
the same as other types of mandatory spending programs for budget scoring purposes.
40
  
From the outset, the scoring of these permanent tax expenditures included their costs 
throughout the full ten-year budget window.  Since EGTRRA, however, the use of 
temporary tax provisions has greatly increased.  This increase can be directly attributable 
to the advantageous budget manipulations that are possible with temporary tax 
expenditure items.
41
  By enacting temporary rather than permanent tax legislation, 
                                               
34 Hungerford, supra note 13, at 2 (“In some instances, such as for the Medicaid program, funding 
is provided in the annual appropriations acts, but the Appropriations Committees do not effectively control 
it.”). 
35 Yin, supra note 5, at 183-4. 
36 The Budget Act requires CBO and the Department of the Treasury to annually publish detailed 
lists of tax expenditures.  This report is also furnished to the House and Senate Budget Committees.  See Staff 
of Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 17, at 1. 
37 Id. 
38 Kleinbard, supra note 6, at 2 (“By excluding tax expenditures from the reach of most budget 
framework processes, Congress privileges tax expenditures over explicit spending.”). 
39 All provisions in EGTRRA had an expiration date of December 31, 2010. Economic Growth and 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §901(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (2001). 
40 Yin, supra note 5, at 183-4. 
41 Kysar, supra note 5, at 340. 
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lawmakers are able to manipulate budget windows and scoring calculations to capitalize 
on peculiarities in the procedural budget rules, such as the PAYGO and Byrd rules.  
2. PAYGO 
PAYGO rules generally require that the estimated budget effects of any new or 
augmented mandatory spending or tax expenditures be “paid for” with offsetting revenue 
increases or spending cuts.
42
  Thus, the PAYGO rules are intended to impose fiscal 
restraint on lawmakers by requiring that new spending or revenue reducing legislation be 
made at least revenue-neutral.  Persistent concerns about the vast federal budget deficit 
have only heightened Congressional and public pressure to enact revenue-neutral or 
revenue-increasing legislation.  The PAYGO rules do not apply to discretionary 
spending, which is controlled and limited by the amount of appropriations made available 
in the annual Budget Resolution.
43
  However, PAYGO principles are applied to both 
mandatory spending and tax expenditure proposals. 
The PAYGO rules were first imposed through the Budget Enforcement Act of 
1990, and extended in 1993 and 1999 until they ultimately expired in 2002.
44
  In 2010, 
the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act
45
 was passed by Congress and signed into law by 
President Obama, making PAYGO once again mandatory.  Under the current PAYGO 
statute, if legislation is passed that is projected to increase the deficit for either the 
following five- or ten-year budget window period, then automatic across-the-board cuts 
in selected mandatory programs (sequestration) is triggered.
46
   
Although on its face the PAYGO statute is supposed to apply to tax expenditures 
and mandatory spending rules with equal force, in practice it does not.  The scoring 
mechanisms and statutory exceptions significantly compromised the PAYGO statute’s 
ability to damper tax expenditure legislation.  They specifically excluded many of the tax 
extender provisions by incorporating into the budget baseline trillions of dollars in tax 
expenditures, including many of the EGTRRA and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) tax cuts, as well as the costs of extending 
alternative-minimum-tax (AMT) relief and permanently reenacting the estate-tax 
exemption at 2009 levels.
47
  As a result, only new tax expenditures proposed in excess of 
these baseline amounts will result in deficit increasing budget scoring that requires 
revenue offsets to avoid sequestration.  
The House of Representatives and Senate also each have their own internal set of 
PAYGO rules.  Under both sets of internal rules, proposed legislation must be revenue-
neutral over both a five- and ten-year budget window.
48
  These internal rules have no 
force of law and can be waived (for example, the rules were waived in order to pass the 
2007 and 2008 AMT relief for individuals),
49
 but do provide a procedure for objecting 
                                               
42 Office of Budget Management (OMB), THE STATUTORY PAY-AS-YOU-GO ACT OF 2010: A 
DESCRIPTION, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/paygo_description/.  
43 Id. 
44 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990); 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993); Balanced Budget Act 
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). 
45 Statutory Pay As You Go Act of 2010, P.L. 111-39, 124 Stat. 8 (2010). 
46 Specified exemptions from sequestration include Social Security, most unemployment benefits, 
veterans’ benefits, interest on the debt, Medicaid, food stamps, and federal retirement.  OMB, supra note 42. 
47 Accordingly, when many of these tax cuts and the AMT patch were made permanent, no new 
offsets were needed because their projected costs were already included in the baseline. 
48 Kleinbard, supra note 6, at 16. 
49 Id. at 19. 
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Congress members to raise points of order against their colleagues when the PAYGO 
rules have been violated.
50
  The House of Representatives and Senate each have internal 
procedural rules for waiving the point of order.  While the Senate requires a three-fifths 
vote of all members (i.e. sixty votes), the House of Representatives only requires a simple 
majority of the Rules Committee.
51
  If the point of order is sustained, it will serve to 
strike the PAYGO violating proposal from the bill.
52
   
As discussed more fully below in Part III.A, the PAYGO rules are easily subject 
to manipulation through the use of temporary tax expenditure provisions.  Unlike 
mandatory spending programs, temporary tax expenditure provisions are only scored as 
having revenue effects associated with the provision being enacted throughout its 
proposed duration rather than throughout the entire budget window period.  Thus, if tax 
expenditure legislation is only enacted for a one- or two-year period, it will require far 
fewer offsets to satisfy PAYGO than if it were permanently enacted.  For example, a two-
year extension of the R&D credit may be scored as costing $15 billion (its two-year 
estimated cost), rather than $100 billion (its projected cost over the full ten-year budget 
window).  In order to comply with PAYGO, legislators need only identify $15 billion of 
revenue sources in order for the proposed two-year bill to move forward. 
3. Reconciliation and the Byrd Rule 
The Budget Act was enacted to establish the congressional budget process.
53
  It 
established the Senate and House Budget Committees as well as the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO).
54
  The Budget Act provides for the annual adoption of a concurrent 
budget resolution, which may include reconciliation instructions directing one or more 
committees to propose changes to existing laws in order to conform federal spending, 
revenue and debt targets to the budget resolution.
55
  The Budget Act created a fast-track 
process for these so-called reconciliation bills, which propose the changes in law 
pursuant to the reconciliation instructions.
56
  The expedited process restricts the time 
limits for debate and thereby removes the threat of filibuster, an obstructive 
parliamentary practice whereby members opposed to the proposed bill can extend debate 
in order to delay or prevent a vote entirely.
57
  In order for a proposed bill to receive the 
benefit of the reconciliation process and avoid filibuster, Congress must pass a budget 
resolution for each budget category setting forth limitations on spending (a “section 302 
spending allocation”), and any provision that exceeds the allocation must be coupled with 
a revenue-raising provision.
58




As originally conceived, the reconciliation process was intended to provide a way 
to expedite spending and revenue bills in order to bring down the deficit.
60
  However, 
                                               
50 Id.  
51 U.S. Senate Committee on the Budget, BUDGET POINTS OF ORDER (2014), 
http://www.budget.senate.gov/republican/public/index.cfm/points-of-order. 
52 Id. 
53 Budget Act, supra note 11. 
54 Id. at §§ 101-102 and 201. 
55 Bill Heniff, Jr., Cong. Research Serv., THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS TIMETABLE, 2 
(2008), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/98-472.pdf. 
56 Budget Act, supra note 11, at §§ 310(c). 
57 Debate time is limited to 20 hours in both the Senate and House of Representatives. 
58 Kysar, supra note 3, at 1020. 
59 Budget Act, supra note 11, at §§ 310(c). 
60 Kysar, supra note 3, at 1019.  
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because by its terms the 1974 Budget Act merely references only “changes” to spending 
and revenue amounts and not specifically to decreases or increases in such amounts, 
savvy Congressional members realized that the reconciliation process could be used to 
fast-track deficit-increasing legislation.
61
  In fact, in 2001 Congress passed EGTRAA 
through the reconciliation process with estimated costs of over $1 trillion, sidestepping 
any chance of filibuster.
62
 
The Byrd Rule, named after Senator Robert Byrd, was introduced in 1985 as an 
additional internal rule in the Senate intended to prevent Senators from attaching 
unrelated bills to the reconciliation bill.
63
  The Byrd Rule establishes a point of order 
against such extraneous provisions.  Importantly, one of the categories of unrelated 
provisions that cannot be attached to reconciliation bills are any provisions that decrease 
revenues beyond the applicable window of the budget resolution.
64
  If the presiding 
officer sustains the point of order, the offending provision is struck from the bill, but the 
rest of the legislation remains.
65
 
Tax expenditure provisions that are temporary in nature are advantageous in the 
reconciliation process in two ways.  First, temporary tax expenditures are more likely to 
make it into the reconciliation process because their lower estimated costs make it easier 
to satisfy the section 302 budget allocation limits.  Because temporary tax provisions are 
scored by giving effect only for their statutory enactment periods, their scored costs will 
be lower than an otherwise similar permanent piece of tax legislation or a temporary 
mandatory spending provision.  Moreover, any legislation that exceeds the allocation 
must be coupled with a revenue-raising provision, so the lower the scored cost of a 
proposed expenditure, the fewer offsetting revenue-raising provisions will be needed to 
offset it. 
Second, because the Byrd Rule will be triggered if a bill results in budget outlays 
beyond the budget window of the resolution, sunset provisions can be used on tax 
expenditures to prevent invocation of the Byrd Rule.  If a tax expenditure is proposed as 
permanent legislation, it will have projected costs beyond the applicable budget window 
and can be struck from the reconciliation bill by raising a point of order.  However, no 
matter how high the anticipated cost of a tax expenditure bill, as long as it does not 
generate costs beyond the budget window, it will not be subject to the Byrd Rule.  For 
this reason, the entire EGTRAA was sunsetted before the end of the reconciliation budget 
                                               
61 Robert Dove, Former U.S. Senate Parliamentarian 1981-1987, C-SPAN, Use of Senate Filibuster 
(Mar. 12, 2010), available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?292506-1/use-senate-filibuster (00:50-00:53). 
62 Kysar, supra note 3, at 1020 (“Although the original intent of the reconciliation process was to 
provide an easier path to enact deficit-reducing legislation, in 2001, Republicans won a procedural battle by 
passing one of the largest tax cuts in history, EGTRRA, through the reconciliation process in order to avoid a 
filibuster.”); see also Gale and Orszag, supra note 3, at 1154 (noting that the Byrd Rule itself did not 
necessitate the sunset provisions, rather the lack of support from 60 senators required to waive the rule 
necessitated the sunset).  
63 Robert Keith, Cong. Research Serv., THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS: THE SENATE’S 
“BYRD RULE” (2010), available at 
http://democrats.budget.house.gov/sites/democrats.budget.house.gov/files/documents/reconciliation.pdf; 
Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative Process, 43 B.C. L. REV. 
863, 874 (2002). 
64 Id. 
65 BUDGET POINTS OF ORDER, supra note 51.  Provisions that are removed from reconciliation 
legislation as a result of a Byrd Rule objection are sometimes referred to as “Byrd droppings.” Yin, supra 
note 5, at 215. 
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window in order to avoid invocation of the Byrd Rule.
66
  Since EGTRAA, numerous tax 
provisions have been passed as temporary legislation and been able to sidestep 
application of the Byrd Rule.
67
 
4. Senate Point of Order 
The Senate more recently enacted another point of order (SPO), aimed at budget 
distortions that can occur when proposed legislation is expected to have revenue effects 
outside of the original budget window period.  When permanent spending legislation is 
enacted, revenue neutrality only has to be achieved for the relevant five- and ten-year 
window periods in order to avoid invocation of the PAYGO rules.  However, many 
provisions have enormous budgetary consequences beyond the first ten years of 
enactment.  Under the current budget rules, there is no mechanism requiring a re-
evaluation or re-neutralization of existing spending provisions whose costs greatly exceed 
projected offsetting revenue sources. 
The SPO tries to manage deliberate attempts by lawmakers to escape the reach of 
PAYGO rules by back loading the revenue outlays of proposed legislation to periods 
beyond the budget window.  Under the SPO, Senators can raise an objection and block 
consideration of legislation that is projected to result in net outlays in excess of $5 billion 
in any one of the four successive ten-year periods beginning after the initial ten-year 
budget window.
68




While the SPO may provide a deterrent for passing legislation with significant 
projected costs beyond the budget window, it has little to no effect on temporary tax 
legislation.  In fact, it provides an incentive for lawmakers to make tax expenditures 
temporary.  If temporary tax legislation is proposed, the costs will be front loaded in the 
budget window and will have no projected effect beyond the initial ten-year budget 
window period.  They will thus be able to escape the reaches of the SPO. 
III. THE BLACK AND WHITE MAGIC OF TEMPORARY TAX 
EXPENDITURES 
As suggested above, temporary tax expenditures are prized gems of lawmakers 
for a number of reasons.  First, they are easier to manipulate for budget scoring purposes.  
They can escape the reaches of any applicable PAYGO rules by requiring fewer offsets to 
achieve revenue-neutrality, as well as sidestep the Byrd Rule and SPO.  Second, when tax 
expenditures are enacted as temporary provisions, there are more opportunities for 
lawmakers to extract rents from private parties that are eager to ensure the renewal of 
their favored tax break.  Third, tax expenditures also enjoy a certain political opaqueness 
that can enhance opportunities for political maneuvering and make it easier to target 
benefits towards private interests.
70
  Targeted benefits to select industries or taxpayers 
                                               
66 Kysar, supra note 3, at 1021; Rudolph G. Penner, Urban Institute and Brookings Institution Tax 
Policy, Taxes and the Budget: What are extenders?  Briefing Book (Feb. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/taxes-budget/extenders.cfm. 
67 See, e.g., Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRAA), Pub. L. No. 
108-27, §§107, 303, 117 Stat. 752, 755-56, 764 (most provisions were set to expire between 2004 and 2009). 
68 BUDGET POINTS OF ORDER, supra note 51, at 2. 
69 Id. at 1.  But see Yin, supra note 5, at 224 (“It seems doubtful that estimates of the long-term 
budget effects of proposals increasing and decreasing the deficit can be made with sufficient precision to 
carry out the point of order.”). 
70 Kleinbard, supra note 6, at 5 (“Existing tax expenditures hide in plain sight, appearing in the 
operative Budget Resolution only as an undifferentiated component of baseline revenues. The low salience of 
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that are buried in the Internal Revenue Code are much less transparent to the general 
public and when passed often receive less Congressional scrutiny than targeted 
mandatory spending provisions.
71
 Moreover, some politicians may prefer the use of 
expiring tax provisions because they are able to essentially consent to a tax increase by 
taking no affirmative legislative action on an expiring tax extender.
72
  Lastly, temporary 
tax provisions can, in theory, provide more opportunity for legislative review and 
refinement.  If a statute expires and is up for renewal, legislators have an opportunity 
(whether or not utilized) to assess the effectiveness of the rule and adjust, amend or 
discontinue the provision to the extent it is not fulfilling its original objectives.
73
 
While there may be certain political and legislative advantages to temporary tax 
legislation, there are countervailing costs.  Fiscal accountability and legislative stability 
can be significantly compromised as a result of the budget manipulations.  Enacting 
temporary legislation may obscure the true long-term costs to legislators of provisions 
that in substance are intended to remain permanent (for example the R&D credit), as well 
as result in deeper current tax cuts than may otherwise be made.  Moreover, if a tax 
provision is intended to affect taxpayer behavior but its legislative fate is constantly in 
limbo, as is the case for the current fifty plus expired tax extenders, taxpayers may over- 
or under-respond to the provision.  In addition, while decreased transparency may be 
beneficial from the perspective of politicians, it also makes it harder for the public to 
monitor and hold accountable political actors.  As a result, the voting public may not be 
fully aware of the decisions being made by their elected officials. 
A. Budget Manipulation 
The current legislative budget rules, described in Part II.B above, are subject to 
two primary forms of manipulation by lawmakers.  First, by using temporary tax 
legislation, lawmakers are able to limit the estimated costs of a proposed bill for scoring 
purposes.  This makes it much easier to find necessary offsets to achieve revenue-neutral 
legislation in accordance with the PAYGO rules.  It also makes it much easier for a 
proposed tax expenditure to take advantage of the reconciliation process and avoid 
invocation of the Byrd Rule.  Second, because PAYGO constraints are only confined to a 
finite time horizon (typically a five- or ten- year budget window), permanent legislation 
that has substantial back loaded costs is able to seemingly satisfy revenue-neutrality upon 
enactment, even if over time it results in significant deficit increases.  The Byrd Rule is 
only applicable to legislation proposed as part of a reconciliation bill.
74
  The SPO tries to 
                                                                                                                                
tax expenditures, when compared with the spending programs for which they substitute, affects not only 
public perceptions but also Congressional consideration.”). 
71 See generally, id. at 6-7. 
72 Rather, they will just let the beneficial tax provision die, in substance causing an increase in tax 
revenues.  Howard Gleckman, Can Expiring Tax Provisions Save The Budget Talks? FORBES (Nov. 8, 2013), 
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2013/11/08/can-expiring-tax-provisions-save-the-budget-
talks/. 
73 In fact, some commentators argue that sunsets should be used as a way to prevent obsolete laws 
from remaining on the books.  Thomas Merrill, The Federalist Society 2011 National Lawyers Convention, 
16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 339, 343 (Spring 2012) (citing generally Guido Calabresi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE 
AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Guido Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act: A Comment, 4 VT. L. REV. 247 
(1979); Jack Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L. REV. 
203 (1979)). 
74 See Keith, supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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address this by requiring revenue neutrality for each of the successive four decades after 
the initial budget window,
75
 but as illustrated below, this rule can also be manipulated. 
The problem with these budget manipulations is that they enable lawmakers to 
skew the impact that proposed provisions will have on the overall fiscal health of the 
nation.
76
  As illustrated below, if temporary provisions are enacted that are in fact 
intended to be permanent in nature, as is the case with most of the tax extenders, then 
lawmakers are able to both reduce the amount of offsets necessary for revenue neutrality 
and to push out those lesser offsetting revenues to the latter years of the budget window.  
Not only does this practice systematically understate the full fiscal impact of the 
underlying tax expenditure, but it also allows legislators to make larger current tax cuts or 
increase spending in other programs because more current revenue streams are available 
to offset spending.  In a time when fiscal restraint and attention to deficit reduction are 
touted as top national priorities, lawmaking budget practices that serve to undermine 
these goals are problematic. 
1. Front Loading with Temporary Provisions 
The single largest driver behind the proliferation of temporary tax provisions, or 
tax extenders, is the ability to reduce the upfront estimated costs of the provisions.
77
  
Unlike the scoring estimates for mandatory spending provisions, which ignore sunset 
provisions for spending programs with current-year costs of greater than $50 million,
78
 
the scoring estimates for tax expenditures treat a provision as becoming inactive on the 
sunset date.
79
  This is true whether or not a renewal of the tax expenditure is expected at 
that time. 
Because a tax expenditure is more likely to be passed if it is packaged as revenue 
neutral, a lower estimated cost over the budget window through the use of an early 
expiration date provides two advantages, as illustrated in Chart B below.  It lowers the 
amount of revenue sources or spending cuts that are needed in order to offset the 
expected cost.  It also provides more offsetting years in the budget window to find those 
revenue sources and spending cuts. 
Examples of tax extenders in this category include the R&D credit, the subpart F 
exception for active finance income, and numerous energy incentives.
80
  Even when 
lawmakers would like to make these provisions permanent, they find it too expensive to 
do so.  Offsetting revenue sources are just not available to make their permanent 
enactment fiscally or politically viable.  In fact, renewing the existing tax extenders for 
one year will impose an estimated cost of $54 billion.
81
  In contrast, if these same 





                                               
75 BUDGET POINTS OF ORDER, supra note 51, at 2. 
76 Gale and Orszag, supra note 3, at 1554 (“As sunsets have come to dominate the tax code, the 
official budget projections have become increasingly divorced from reality). 
77 Marron, supra note 4, at 6. 
78 See Cong. Budget Office, supra note 10. 
79 Marron, supra note 4, at 6. 
80 Id. at 3-4. 
81 Sherlock, supra note 2, at 6 (Tbl.1). 
82 Id. 
16 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.6:1 





As illustrated in Chart B, legislative Option A represents a proposed tax 
expenditure’s estimated cost over a twenty-year fiscal period.  Under the current 
legislative rules, Option A would be scored as having an official cost of $35 billion over 
the initial ten-year budget window and would require lawmakers to find $35 billion of 
additional revenue or spending cut sources in order to make the proposal revenue neutral.  
If bundled with legislative Option D, Option A would satisfy the PAYGO requirements. 
Legislative Option B represents the estimated cost of enacting the same tax 
expenditure, except that the provision expires after two years.  Under the current budget 
scoring rules, Option B would only have an official cost of $5 billion that would need to 
be offset, even if it was expected that the same provision would be extended throughout 
fiscal years three through ten.  Not only does Option B have a lower “official” cost than 
Option A, but lawmakers are able to use ten fiscal years (years 1-10) to generate offsets 
for only two fiscal years of outlays (years 1-2).  If a revenue generating provision was 
also proposed and was estimated to generate $5 billion during fiscal years 9 and 10, such 
as Option E, it would be unable to fully offset Option A because the total official 
                                               
83 Chart B assumes the applicable budget window period covers ten fiscal years. 
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revenues generated for the budget window would only be $5 billion in comparison to the 
official cost of Option A of $35 billion.  On the other hand, the same revenue provision 
could be used to offset Option B and PAYGO would be satisfied.  Moreover, the Byrd 
Rule and SPO would be satisfied because there would be no scored revenue effects for 
Option B beyond the initial ten-year budget window period.   
The disparity between opportunities for budget manipulation with Option A and 
B endure even if, as illustrated with Option C, the same tax expenditure is continuously 
extended through a series of temporary provisions.  Even though each time the tax 
expenditure is extended it will have to be fully offset with a revenue raising provision, the 
renewed tax expenditure will gain additional budget window years during which to find 
offsetting revenues.  As a result, revenue neutrality can be significantly more distorted 
than it can be with an equivalent permanent piece of legislation.   
For example, if upon the expiration of Option B, Congress enacts identical 
legislation with Option C, it will be able to use fiscal years 3 through 12 (the then 
applicable ten-year budget window) to find offsetting revenues.  As such, it could use 
Option F to couple with Option C in order to make it revenue neutral and satisfy 
PAYGO.  Note none of the revenues for Option F accrue during the original ten-year 
budget window.  If the same provision is similarly extended through the end of fiscal year 
10 and is in each instance paid for with revenues generated during the last two-years of 
the then applicable budget window, then by the end of fiscal year 10, a significant gap in 
revenues will occur.  The actual cost of the tax expenditure (assuming the projections are 
accurate and remain constant) will be identical to those in Option A where the legislation 
is made permanent from the outset.  Fiscal years one through ten will incur a total cost of 
$35 billion.  However, the only revenue raised during this period would be $5 billion 
(through Option D).  This tax expenditure would create a $30 billion budget deficit over 
the initial ten-year period.  By contrast, if instead Option A were enacted, it would 
require at the outset $35 billion of revenue to offset its cost during the initial ten fiscal 
years and no deficit would be created. 
It is also worthwhile to note that if legislators pass the $35 billion revenue raiser 
Option D along with Option B, which will soak up only $5 billion of revenue offsets, 
Congress will be able to enact an addition $30 billion of spending provisions and still 
satisfy the current PAYGO and revenue neutrality principles.  This is true even if, as 
discussed above, the full cost of the tax expenditure contained in Option B will be $35 
billion if it is continuously reenacted for the full ten-year fiscal period.  If Option A were 
instead enacted making the tax expenditure permanent, or if Option B were scored the 
same as Option A (which it would be if it were a mandatory spending program), then 
Option D would be fully offset by the tax provision and no additional revenues would be 
available to offset other spending programs. 
2. Back Loading with Permanent Provisions 
Another problem with limiting the inclusion of a proposed provision’s budget 
impact to a finite window is that revenue effects that take place outside the relevant 
budget window period are ignored.  Because the baseline assumes permanent legislation 
will continue forever, once enacted, the cost of permanent legislation beyond the end of 
the initial budget window essentially disappears from the legislative process.
84
  Thus, a 
proposed provision can be scored at the outset as revenue neutral for PAYGO purposes, 
                                               
84 Yin, supra note 5, at 204. 
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even if the purported offsetting provision is not expected to generate any revenues 
outside of the initial ten-year budget window and the expenditure is projected to continue 
to generate substantial outlays.  Likewise, if a permanent tax expenditure becomes much 
more costly than originally projected (or conversely if projected revenue offsets end up 
falling short), there is no automatic process to recalibrate that provision’s neutrality and 
ballooning deficits can result. 
The SPO can help mitigate the issues related to the former problem, but not the 
latter.  If a permanent tax expenditure is paired with a revenue generating provision that 
is only expected to raise revenues prior to the end of the initial ten-year budget window, 
the SPO may be triggered.  The SPO can be invoked if other offsetting provisions are not 
available for the outer years and projected deficits exceed $5 billion in any of the 
subsequent four ten-year budget windows.
85
  If, on the other hand, deficits are incurred 
because expected projected outlays were too high or inflows were too low, the SPO will 
not be implicated.  Although the SPO’s focus is on the time period outside of the initial 
budget window, the determination of whether or not the SPO is triggered is made at the 
time the enacting bill is deliberated and no automatic subsequent redeterminations are 
made.  Accordingly, if subsequent budget shortfalls do occur as a result of the legislation, 
Congress will on its own have to initiate a completely new bill to either amend or enact 
legislation that either reduces the outlays generated by the existing tax expenditure 
provision or raises new offsetting revenues. 
Proponents of tax expenditure legislation can also exploit the use of finite budget 
windows by either delaying the effective date of the legislation and/or back loading major 
outlays of the provision until late in the budget window.
86
  As illustrated in Chart C 
below, these strategies will decrease the amount of offsets necessary for neutrality. 
 





As depicted in Chart C, Option X represents a baseline case of the scoring of a 
permanently enacted tax expenditure projected to generate $25 billion of costs during 
                                               
85 BUDGET POINTS OF ORDER, supra note 51, at 2. 
86 Similar manipulation is possible with all permanent spending provisions. 
87 Chart C assumes the applicable budget window period covers ten fiscal years. 
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each ten-year fiscal period.  In order to make Option X satisfy PAYGO, lawmakers will 
have to come up with $25 billion of offsets to cover the official ten-year cost of the 
provision upon enactment.  On the other hand, if the same tax expenditure is enacted, but 
lawmakers push back the effective date for two years, as in Option Y, they will only have 
to find $20 billion of offsets to comply with PAYGO.  This option may be attractive to 
lawmakers who will be able to take credit for enacting a particular tax cut, while at the 
same time reducing the amount of revenue offsets they will be required to produce in 
order to get the bill through Congress. 
Note, Options X and Y will require an equal amount of offsets in fiscal years 
eleven through twenty in order to avoid invocation of the SPO.  Specifically, they will 
have to come up with at least $20 billion in revenue sources or spending cuts for fiscal 
years eleven through twenty in order to avoid triggering the $5 billion SPO shortfall 
threshold.
88
  Option Z, however, avoids this problem.  By combing the tactics of 
legislative back loading (or phase-ins) with a sunset provision, Option C both reduces the 
present offset cost of the proposed tax expenditure and avoids application of the SPO.  
Option Z’s official cost is $20 billion for the initial ten-year budget period (the same as 
Option Y).  However, unlike Option Y, even if no other offsetting revenues are available 
for fiscal years eleven through twenty, the SPO cannot be invoked because the projected 
deficits in years eleven through twenty do not exceed $5 billion.  Moreover, the above-
illustrated scoring of Option Z is only available with respect to a tax provision, because 
any other type of mandatory spending provision will be scored the same as Option Y 
because only the phase-in (and not sunset) will be respected for scoring purposes.
89
  
B. Rent Extraction 
Another common complaint with the way tax expenditures, in particular, are 
treated under the current budget rules is that they create an environment that encourages 
the extraction of rents by lawmakers.  The fact that offsets are required for all tax 
expenditures creates a fierce competition among special interest groups, each hoping that 
it is not harmed by any trade offs that must be made for the sake of revenue neutrality.
90
  
Lobbyists for particular industries or interest groups therefore seek to pay rent to 
lawmakers (in the form of campaign contributions and votes) in order to encourage them 
to extend or propose special tax breaks or to prevent them from closing beneficial 
loopholes.  Because the proposals will need to be revenue neutral, the offsetting spending 
reductions or revenue increases can come at the expense of a politically inactive minority 
or a diffuse majority.  A diffuse majority may not have an incentive to fight the proposed 
change because the individual cost to each member is relatively minor. While this type of 
rent extraction is a problem frequently encountered in politics in general, it is particularly 
troublesome in the tax expenditure context for several reasons. 
Because of the ever-increasing use of temporary rather then permanent tax 
legislation, politicians are often able to demand payment at predictably frequent 
intervals.
91
  Many favored tax benefits are continually in legislative jeopardy, and even if 
there is only a small chance that a provision will not be renewed, lobbyists will still pay 
                                               
88 See BUDGET POINTS OF ORDER, supra note 51, at 2. 
89 See Cong. Budget Office, supra note 10. 
90 Kysar, supra note 5, at 365 (“[B]y either requiring offsets to tax expenditures or demanding 
sequesters, the budget rules create competition between interests in tax benefits and thus guarantee the 
possibility, although at times remote, of lapse, especially if interest group activity on behalf of the threatened 
provision ceases.”). 
91 Id. 
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rents for fear that if they are inactive, their benefits may be crowded out by other more 
motivated interest groups.
92
  For example, if businesses rely on the R&D credit and it is 
only extended in one- or two-year increments, then even though businesses may be 
relatively certain that the credit will continue to be re-enacted (as it has been fifteen 
times), they will not be willing to take a chance that non-action will cause the provision 
to lapse.  As such they continue to pay rent.  This fear is particularly warranted in the 
current legislative environment where politicians are increasingly willing to break out of 
their predictable budget norms.
93
 
Although businesses should be equally concerned about the threat of repeal in the 
case of permanently enacted legislation, the likelihood of legislative action is much 
smaller because enough momentum would have to be generated in order to get actionable 
repeal legislation on the floor to change the status quo.
94
  When provisions are 
automatically set to expire, on the other hand, the legislative fate of a provision is already 
on the table.   Affected taxpayers are repeatedly put in economic limbo as they await the 
determination of their legislative fate.  As long as the present value of the threatened 
benefits from the expiring legislation exceeds the current lobbying costs, rational interest 
groups will continue to lobby legislators for targeted tax expenditures.
95
  The shorter the 
enactment period for a particular piece of tax legislation, the more frequently the give-
and-take rent extraction game can be played between legislators and their affected 
constituents. 
C. Political Opaqueness 
Another issue with tax expenditures of any duration is that they tend to have a 
less than transparent role in the budget process.
96
  They therefore often assist in obscuring 
legislators’ behavior from the voting public.97  For example, if a minority-targeted tax 
provision is pushed through the reconciliation process in a revenue-neutral way, it can be 
fast-tracked through the legislative process with little to no debate or oversight by the 
substantive Congressional committees.
98
  As discussed above, temporary tax provisions 
are able to capitalize on the reconciliation process more easily because they are scored in 
                                               
92 But see Yin, supra note 5, at 244 (arguing that even if “a credible threat could be made relatively 
costlessly through, for example, the mere sponsorship of a bill or issuance of a press release, it is not clear 
why legislators would prefer to threaten temporary, as opposed to permanent, action. The latter would 
presumably present a more harmful outcome to the interested groups and therefore should generate greater 
returns to forestall the threatened action.”). 
93 For instance, the threat of sequestration, or automatic across-the-board federal spending cuts, at 
one time seemed so onerous that many predicted Congress would never actually let it happen.  However, in 
fiscal 2013 lack of Congressional action led to sequestration. 
94 Manoj Viswanathan, Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code:  A Critical Evaluation and 
Prescriptions for the Future, 2009 FED. B.A. SEC. TAX’N REP. 14, 21 (“Any law enacted by Congress has 
some probability of getting overturned; however, this baseline probability of statute repeal is fairly low.”), 
citing Guido Calabresi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 6 (1982); Kysar, supra note 5, at 365 
(stating “repeal, unlike a lapse after sunset, requires affirmative action by Congress and, thus, endangerment 
to the status quo is greater in the sunset context”). 
95 Id. at 367 (“These scenarios are problematic in that they bolster the competitive advantages of an 
organized minority, thereby increasing the likelihood of a reduction in social welfare due to the greater costs 
imposed on the poorly organized majority.”). 
96 Kleinbard, supra note 6, at 5. 
97 Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253 
(2011). 
98 Kleinbard, supra note 6, at 6-7. 
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such a way that makes achieving revenue neutrality and avoiding the Byrd Rule and SPO 
much easier than it is for their mandatory spending program counterparts.
99
   
Moreover, specialized tax provisions are considered to be less salient (or 
obvious) to the public than equivalent direct spending measures.
100
  It is well established 
that the Internal Revenue Code is a complex labyrinth of rules that leaves even the most 
seasoned tax professionals at times scratching their heads.  Not surprisingly, legislators 
have found that it is much easier to hide targeted legislation benefiting their favorite 
interest groups among the morass of existing tax rules than it is to propose a stand-alone 
traditional spending provision.   
Indeed, it is sometimes impossible to determine from the face of a tax statute 
what subset of taxpayers are actually affected by its terms and what any impact would 
be.
101
  For instance, the average voter may not understand the economic impact that 
adjusting the phase-in or phase-out levels of a particular deduction will have or to what 
extent the double-declining balance depreciation method will favorably impact taxpayers 
versus the straight-line method.
102
  On the other hand, if a law is proposed to give a 
particular industry group cash subsidies through a mandatory spending program, the 
economic transfer of money from the fisc to the interested group may be much more 
transparent to the voting public at large.  
Similarly, the temporary nature of tax provisions can provide a further dimension 
to obscure politically motivated behavior.  For example, fiscal conservatives have been 
known to favor temporary tax expenditures because when necessary, they are able to 
consent to tax increases without taking affirmative legislative action for which their 
constituents may negatively judge them.
103
  Rather, if a tax expenditure expires, the 
politician may simply fail to act to renew the provision.  This inaction will result in an 
overall increase in tax revenues, but optically the public perception of the politician 
would presumably be much more favorable than it would if he or she voted favorably for 
a bill increasing taxes. 
The diminished political transparency of tax expenditures can lead to several 
problems.  First, diminished transparency can result in a diminished ability to 
successfully motivate political opposition at the time of enactment.  This can cause even 
more funds to be funneled to targeted interest groups that are able to effectively capture 
legislative actors by paying rents.  The diffuse majority will be less able to detect, and 
thus respond, to the passage of special targeted tax provisions.  As a result, the organized 
minority will be able to reap economic gains at the expense of the more disorganized 
majority.   
If a targeted tax provision results in an increased economic burden to the average 
taxpayer that is so small they would not rationally organize to oppose the provision even 
if they were aware of it, the reduced salience of targeted tax provisions still diminishes 
the ability of constituents to exercise checks and balances on their elected officials.  If 
legislators are aware that their behavior is not evident to the voting public, they may be 
                                               
99 See discussion in Section III.A supra. 
100 Kleinbard, supra note 6, at 6-7; Schenk, supra note 97.  
101 Schenk, supra note 97, at 257. 
102 The double-declining balance depreciation method significantly accelerates depreciation 
deductions as compared to the straight-line depreciation method. 
103 Gleckman, supra note 72 (“There is no chance that GOP lawmakers will accept tax increases, 
but maybe they would accept revenue by passively conceding the quiet death of scores of temporary tax cuts 
that are due to expire at the end of this year.”). 
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even more likely to act in ways that are contrary to the interests of the majority of their 
constituents. 
D. Uncertainty and Inefficiency 
The uncertainty in a tax extender’s legal status caused by the persistent use of 
temporary legislation not only encourages increased political rent seeking, but also 
creates significant planning and implementation problems for lawmakers and affected 
taxpayers alike.  When the legal status of an extender is unclear, it makes it extremely 
difficult for affected businesses and individual taxpayers to plan ahead. 
Over fifty tax extenders are sitting in legislative limbo, including the R&D credit, 
the subpart F exception for active financing, and the deduction for state and local taxes.
104
  
While it is anticipated that they all will be extended in some form, given the current 
hostile budget environment, nothing is guaranteed.
105
  Even if all of the extenders are 
renewed, Congressional staffers have indicated that Congress will not act on legislation 
until the end of the year.
106
 
When extenders are intended to encourage particular taxpayer behaviors, such as 
innovation with the R&D credit, their purpose is in large part undermined when the 
affected constituents are not sure whether or not they will be entitled to the benefits of the 
provision.
107
  For example, one of the tax extenders that expired at the end of 2013 was a 
provision allowing educators to deduct up to $250 of unreimbursed expenses for books, 
supplies, and computers used in the classroom.
108
  It is not guaranteed that this provision 
will be retroactively extended to apply to educator expenses incurred in 2014 as well.
109
  
Because the legislation was not renewed prior to the start of the 2014-2015 school year 
for elementary and secondary education schools, teachers had to prepare for the classes as 
if the deduction was not available.
110
  While there are teachers who may spend the same 
amount of money on their classroom supplies with or without the deduction, there are 
certainly those for whom the amount, and/or quality of expenditures they make would 
change if they knew those expenses were deductible.  Thus, even if the tax extenders are 
renewed retroactively, the incentives created by these provisions have been 
undermined.
111
   
Moreover, retroactivity can lead to significant costs and added compliance 
complexities with interim financial reporting.
112
 When a significant tax credit, such as the 
                                               
104 See supra note 1. 
105 See supra note 19. 
106 National Council of State Housing Agencies, Camp Continuing Tax Reform Discussions as 
Senate Prepares to Extend Expiring Tax Provisions (2014), available at http://www.ncsha.org/blog/camp-
continuing-tax-reform-discussions-senate-prepares-extend-expiring-tax-provisions. 
107 See Marron, supra note 4, at 2. 
108 I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(D) (effective for taxable years 2002 through 2013). 
109 Internal Revenue Service, Topic 458 – Educator Expense Deduction (Aug. 18, 2014), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc458.html (“The educator expense deduction expired December 31, 2013. 
You may claim it on your tax year 2013 tax return. Under current law, the deduction is not available for tax 
years after 2013.”). 
110 Elisabeth Hulette, Teachers lose deduction for school supplies, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Jan. 20, 
2014), available at http://hamptonroads.com/2014/01/teachers-lose-deduction-school-supplies. (“According 
to a survey by the National School Supply and Equipment Association, teachers spent $485 of their own 
money, on average, on supplies during the 2012-13 school year.”). 
111 Id. 
112 Joe Harpaz, The Real Cost Of The R&D Tax Credit Expiration, FORBES (Feb. 13, 2014), 
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/joeharpaz/2014/02/13/the-real-cost-of-the-rd-tax-credit-expiration/; 
See also Marron, supra note 4, at 2. 
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R&D credit, is expected to, but has not yet been, renewed retroactively, tough decisions 
have to be made.  Companies have to determine whether to book the credit in their 
accruals or wait until the legislation is actually renewed, thereby skewing their interim 
financial results.
113
  A study of public companies that rely on the R&D credit revealed 
that they have less accurate earnings estimates on average by about four cents per share 
due to the expired credit.
114
  There are real financial costs being incurred as a result of the 
legislative uncertainty being created by the persistent use of temporary tax provisions. 
E. Dynamic Lawmaking? 
Although the lack of certainty of an expiring provision may result in certain 
inefficiencies, one purported advantage of temporary tax provisions is that they can more 
readily achieve dynamic lawmaking that is both reflective of the current majority 
preferences and responsive enough to adjust to intervening social and economic 
changes.
115
  Their natural termination is supposed to invite re-deliberation of whether or 
not the provisions, as enacted, are meeting their purported objectives or whether their 
objectives have been completed.  In this way, laws that no longer serve their stated 
purpose or have any relevance are cleansed from the statutory books. 
While this account of the advantages of temporary legislation is potentially 
favorable, unfortunately, tax extenders rarely have been able to achieve any of the 
benefits that can accrue from their temporary status.  First, most of the tax extenders are 
not passed because of lawmakers’ desires to have temporary versus permanent legislation 
as such.
116
  Rather, their temporary status is a byproduct of preferences in the 
Congressional budget rules.
117
  When tax extenders expire en masse (such as the fifty 
plus tax extenders that expired at the end of 2013), none are given due consideration upon 
renewal.
118
  Lawmakers are not examining each extender, piece-by-piece, to assess their 
individual merits.  Instead, the expired or expiring provisions are typically cobbled 
together in a single extender bill and not given any significant individual consideration or 
assessment.
119
   
                                               
113 Id.  
114 Emily Chasan, Firms May Take Hit From Expired R&D Tax Credit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2014 
(citing study conducted by Jeffrey Hoopes, an assistant professor at Ohio State University’s Fisher College of 
Business).  
115 In fact, advocacy for temporary legislation dates back to the Founding Era.   
116 Gale and Orszag, supra note 3, at 1153 (“In principle, sunsets might be justifiable under certain 
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118, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, Hearing on Extenders and Tax Reform: 
Seeking Long-Term Solutions, 112th Cong. at 2 (Jan. 31, 2012) (statement of Rosanne Altshuler) 
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119 Id. 
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Moreover, as discussed above in connection with rent seeking, many of the 
temporary provisions are not reflective of the majority’s present preferences, but rather 
they are byproducts of deals struck with motivated minority groups.
120
  As such, rather 
than providing a fluid process by which laws are able to responsively change to shifting 
dynamics affecting the target of the legislation, temporary provisions are more frequently 
used as avenues for legislators to gain additional rents from a concentrated and motivated 
minority and to mitigate the effects of the budget rules. 
IV. BREAKING THE SPELL WITH NEW BUDGET RULES 
As outlined above, the current budget rules create incentives that are driving 
Congressional behavior.  By scoring tax expenditures differently than other direct 
spending programs, they create a preference for using tax law as the vehicle for 
government intervention, even when it would not otherwise be advantageous to do so.  
For example, other government agencies may have better knowledge, staff, and resources 
to fund, influence, and monitor the legislated issue more directly than the IRS.  
Moreover, the present tax expenditure budget rules do not adequately enforce fiscal 
restraint because the rules are easily manipulated to avoid PAYGO through the use of 
phase-ins and sunsets.
121
  These manipulations can create an artificial preference for 
using temporary tax legislation to enact government expenditures.  As discussed above, 
the use of temporary legislation itself can lead to other problems such as increasing the 




I propose that a fundamental problem with tax expenditure lawmaking is not the 
use of temporary or permanent legislation per se.  Rather, it is the current framework of 
budgetary rules that govern the creation of the tax laws.  Congress has repeatedly 
demonstrated that it is unable to exercise reasonable discretion and engage in optimal 
lawmaking practices without the constraints of some type of precommitment device 
governing their actions.
123
  That is, without ex ante rules in place restricting or directing 
their behavior, they are often unable to resist pressures to act in their own self-interest 
rather than the interests of their constituents.  
As such, rather than add to the existing analysis examining which type of rules, 
temporary or permanent, will cause the least amount of damage under the current 
budgetary framework, in this Article, I explore whether more ideal tax expenditure 
rulemaking can be achieved by modifying the underlying rules themselves.  I propose 
three budget rules and explore the envisioned consequences that these rules would have 
on the current budget process.  I conclude that if implemented, this bundle of proposed 
budget process modifications could yield more ideal tax legislation by instilling more 
fiscal restraint, reducing opportunities for rent seeking, achieving greater political 
transparency, and enhancing legislative stability while retaining legislative flexibility. 
A. Proposed Budget Rules 
I propose three different modifications to the current budget rules:  (i) a 
presumption for budgetary scoring purposes that tax expenditure legislation will endure 
throughout the applicable budget window, whether or not the provision is set to expire 
prior to the end of the window; (ii) if this presumption is overcome and the sunset of a tax 
                                               
120 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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122 See discussions supra Part III.B and D. 
123 Kysar, supra note 5. 
2014] BREAKING THE SPELL OF TAX BUDGET MAGIC 25 
expenditure is given effect, it will have to comply with a more rigorous lock-step 
PAYGO requirement unless it is designated as emergency legislation; and (iii) a 
mandatory review of all permanent tax expenditures will be required after their initial 
ten-year period of enactment.  In examining the consequences that these proposals could 
have on Congressional lawmaking, I conclude that together these rules could enable 
lawmakers to make more disciplined deliberations and trade offs when enacting tax 
expenditure legislation. 
1. Disregard Sunsets for Budget Scoring Purposes 
In order to weaken the preference for tax expenditure legislation over direct 
spending in the budget process and to strengthen adherence to PAYGO principles, I 
propose that sunset provisions should be disregarded presumptively for purposes of 
scoring tax expenditures.
124
  Accordingly, whether or not a proposed piece of tax 
legislation is set to expire prior to the end of the applicable budget window, it would be 
scored by assuming the legislation is in effect throughout the entire budget period. 
Currently, the CBO scores both mandatory and tax expenditures in accordance 
with procedures set up by the now-expired Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985.
125
   Pursuant to this act, early expiration dates of proposed 
legislation are ignored for all spending programs with annual costs in excess of $50 
million.
126
  All other proposals, including tax expenditures, are scored under the 
presumption that any early expiration provision takes effect, even if the provision has 
already been repeatedly extended.
127
  As illustrated above in Chart B, this scoring 
practice can create a preference for using the tax expenditure model over other forms of 
direct government intervention.
128
  Through the use of sunset provisions, lawmakers can 
significantly decrease the estimated costs of proposed temporary tax legislation, push 
offsetting revenues to later fiscal years, and free up existing or proposed revenue streams 
to offset additional spending initiatives or tax cuts.   
I propose that tax expenditure legislation should be scored under principles 
similar to their direct spending counterparts.  Specifically, if any tax expenditure is 
projected to have costs in any year in excess of $50 million (i.e. more than a relatively de 
minimis amount), then any sunset provision presumptively will be disregarded and the 
proposed legislation will be scored as if the legislation is in effect for the entire 
applicable budget window.   
For example, in Chart B above, this proposed scoring rule would require that 
legislative Option B score as having projected costs for the ten-year budget window of 
$35 billion, which is identical to Option A, the permanent but otherwise equivalent 
legislation.  The projected cost of Option B is well above the $50 million threshold, and 
accordingly the proposed statutory sunset after year two would be disregarded.  Unlike 
the current budget system, for PAYGO purposes there would be no advantage for 
proposing Option B over Option A. 
                                               
124 Donald Marron has also suggested this revision to current practice. See Marron supra note 4, at 
2.  See also Gale and Orszag, supra note 3, at 1554 (“CBO treats mandatory spending provisions that expire 
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In some instances, disregarding the sunset date for a proposed tax expenditure 
may not be warranted because the legislation may be proposed in response to an 
emergency or may otherwise be in fact inherently temporary in nature.  Requiring offsets 
for years during which the proposed legislation is not intended to be in effect would be 
unduly onerous and likely not reflective of the anticipated costs of the provision.  As 
such, I believe that it should be a rebuttable presumption that sunset provisions are 
ignored for scoring purposes.  However, the presumption should only be overcome if 
proposed legislation is deemed “emergency legislation” under the existing congressional 
budget rules
129
 or if Congress otherwise concludes that the proposed legislation’s purpose 
and effect is to specifically address a “temporary challenge.”130   
An emergency legislation exemption from the budget rules already exists in 
Congress for purposes of the PAYGO statute.
131
  It provides that if a provision is 
designated as an emergency under the statutory PAYGO Act, then neither the CBO nor 
OMB can include the projected budgetary effects of the provision in its estimates.
132
  As 
such, no offsetting revenues are required for emergency legislation.  For example, 
emergency provisions directly targeted towards helping victims of natural disasters or 
acts of terrorism will be exempted from the presumptive rules and excluded from the 
scoring estimates, assuming Congress designated them as such.
133
 
Even if there is not an emergency, Congress should be able to obtain an 
exemption from the mandatory full budget window scoring if they are able to sustain a 
“temporary challenge” designation supported by CBO estimates.  A temporary challenge 
designation will only be able to be made if the outlays and effects of a targeted piece of 
legislation are not expected or projected to exceed a certain number of years (e.g. four 
years).  For example, current temporary provisions, such as the provision to allow 
homeowners to exclude from income the forgiveness of underwater mortgage debt, 
would have to fall within the temporary challenge designation in order to escape the 
presumption.  In making this determination, the CBO would have to analyze whether the 
projected outlays and effects of the legislation are of an inherently finite nature to warrant 
temporary challenge classification.  Procedural backstops should be put in place to 
safeguard against any potential abuse or over-use of the temporary challenge designation 
by Congress.  For instance, there should be a limit on the number of times and active 
legislative years a particular provision can be deemed a “temporary challenge.” 134  
However, because, as discussed below, temporary challenge legislation is subject to a 
more rigorous lock-step PAYGO rule, the ability for lawmakers to engage in budget 
manipulations will be limited in any event.    
                                               
129 Congress may exempt the budgetary effects of a provision in legislation from certain 
enforcement procedures by designating the provision as an “emergency” provision. If so designated, the 
provision’s projected spending and revenue effects are not counted for purposes of enforcing the budget 
rules.  Cong. Research Serv., EMERGENCY DESIGNATION: CURRENT BUDGET RULES AND PROCEDURES (Jan. 6, 
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130 Marron, supra note 4, at 7. 
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132 Id. at § 933(g)(4). 
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On the other hand, current provisions such as the R&D credit and the deduction 
for state and local taxes would not be excluded from the reaches of the mandatory scoring 
rule because they would not be proposed in response to an emergency and they would not 
qualify for temporary challenge status.  Accordingly, if they were once again proposed 
through a temporary extension, under the proposed budget rule they would be scored as 
having revenue impacts for the entire applicable budget window.   
2. Lock-Step PAYGO 
If the presumption for full budget window scoring is overcome through the 
designation of a “temporary challenge,” the temporary tax provision should be scored as 
such and projected costs should take into account the sunset provision.  This will allow 
temporary challenge legislation to require fewer offsets to achieve revenue neutrality.  
However, temporary challenge provisions should have to adhere to what I call a “lock-
step PAYGO” requirement.135  
Lock-step PAYGO will only allow qualifying offsets to be made from revenues 
generated during the term of the temporary legislation and not from the entire budget 
window period.
136
  For example, if a temporary challenge tax expenditure is only 
proposed to be in effect for two years, lawmakers would have to come up with revenue 
offsets or spending decreases from that same two year period.   If Option B in Chart B 
was proposed and was able to secure temporary challenge status, unlike the current 
budget rules, it could not use Option E to offset the expenditures and satisfy lock-step 
PAYGO.  Rather, $5 billion of revenue sources would have to be found from fiscal years 
one and two.  This rule would thereby mitigate the ability of legislators to finance current 
expenditures with future revenue streams and thus help instill more fiscal restraint. 
3. Mandatory Baseline Review 
Lastly, I propose that there should be a baseline review of all permanently 
enacted legislation at the end of the initial ten-year budget window.  If the difference 
between the original projected costs for the succeeding five-year period is more than 
some threshold amount (e.g., $2 billion)
137
 less than the new projected costs over the 
same five years, Congress will need to find new offsets for the difference or risk 
sequestration.  
As mentioned above, the JCT provides an annual Tax Expenditure Report to both 
chambers of Congress.
138
  This report is currently used for informational purposes only 
and serves no active role in the budget process.  This report contains estimates for tax 
expenditures projected to exceed $50 million over the immediately ensuing five-year 
period.  Importantly, when putting together these projections, the JCT takes into account 
statistics from recent returns.  Thus, over time these estimates reflect the historical impact 
that the provision has actually had since its enactment.  I believe that this Tax 
Expenditure Report could serve as the basis for the mandatory review process. 
                                               
135 I do not believe that emergency legislation should be subject to this requirement.  Emergency 
legislation would be exempt from the PAYGO requirements. 
136 See also Marron, supra note 4, at 7. 
137 The threshold amount would be highly dependent on the level of fiscal restraint Congress would 
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balance the costs of an existing tax expenditure, and vice-a-versa.  This number is relatively consistent with 
the $5 billion SPO requirement, which covers a ten-year budget window. 
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A weakness of the current budget process is that it only includes, and thus 
requires offsets for, costs projected to be incurred over a ten-year budget window.  
Additional budget costs incurred after this period are not taken into account because they 
become folded into the budget baseline.  Therefore, the true budgetary impact of any 
proposed permanent legislation is understated to the extent that actual costs exceed 
projected costs.
139
   
The SPO attempts to get Senators to consider projected escalating costs that may 
occur outside the initial ten-year budget window by requiring projected deficits not to 
exceed $5 billion over each of the following four ten-year periods.
140
  However, to the 
extent that projected costs are significantly understated relative to actual costs, there 
currently is no specific mechanism in place to force Congress to recalibrate the budget. 
Instituting a mandatory review would prevent existing legislation that has significant 
underestimated or unforeseen costs from being permanently rolled into the budget 
baseline.  Moreover, it would force Congress to affirmatively acknowledge the 
accumulation of escalating deficits.  Lawmakers would have to act by finding new offsets 
for the existing provision or be forced to scale back the current level of provided benefits.  
Even if instead Congress chose to overturn or waive this budgetary rule,
141
 lawmakers 
would still have to acknowledge the budgetary problem and could not simply continue on 
with its proverbial head in the budgetary sand. 
B. Consequences of the Proposed Budget Rules 
If implemented, these budget rules would yield a more nuanced use of temporary 
legislation that would maximize their benefits while limiting situations where they are 
more commonly abused.  The rules would impose more fiscal discipline on lawmakers 
while preserving the ability to tailor the term of legislation to specific situations—leaving 
in place the ability to capitalize on benefits of both short- and long-term tax legislation, 
where appropriate.  These rules would increase fiscal transparency as to the true cost of 
legislation and prohibit the manipulation of estimates achieved by phase-outs and budget 
window and baseline manipulations.  Lastly, they would potentially diminish, at least 
relative to the current system, the ability of special interest groups to extract rents from 
politicians. 
1. Decrease Opportunities for Budget Manipulation and Increase 
Fiscal Restraint 
The proposed bundle of budgetary rules should limit the ability of lawmakers to 
manipulate budget scoring.  As discussed above, if sunsets are disregarded for budget 
scoring purposes, lawmakers would have to fully account and find revenue offsets for the 
total cost of the proposed tax expenditure over the full ten-year budget window.  In Chart 
B, above, assuming that no emergency or temporary effect exception applied, Option B, 
which sunsets after two years, would be scored the same as Option A.  Not only would 
legislators have to acknowledge the full $35 billion cost of the tax expenditure over the 
initial ten-year budget window, but they would also have to find $35 billion of revenue 
offsets in order to satisfy PAYGO.  This is drastically different from the $5 billion of 
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offsets they would have to find during the initial ten-year budget period if they merely 
extended Option B every two years.
142
   
Even if a tax expenditure were deemed to satisfy the temporary challenge 
exception, the lock-step PAYGO requirement would still limit lawmakers’ ability to 
create significant gaps between the tax expenditures and offsetting revenue sources.  For 
example, even if Option B met the temporary challenge standard, revenue offsets would 
have to be found during years one and two.  Likewise, if it were renewed after the first 
two years for another two-year period, as in Option C, unlike with the current budget 
rules, Option F would not be able to offset it.  Lock-step PAYGO would require the 
revenue offsets to come from years three and four.  As a result, under the proposed rules, 
if the tax expenditure in Option B was repeatedly renewed, it would have to generate the 
same amount of offsets during the first ten fiscal years as would Option A.  The only 
difference is that rather than having to come up with the full $35 billion of offsets 
upfront, renewing the legislation piecemeal would enable lawmakers to stage the funding 
of the expenditure throughout the ten-year budget window. 
2. Maintain Legislative Flexibility and Enhance Oversight 
Although the proposed budget rules mandate more stringent scoring practices for 
temporary tax provisions, they do not preclude the ability to tailor the term of any 
legislation to specific situations where appropriate.  Although the mandatory scoring of 
legislation for the full ten-year budget window would seemingly create a de-facto 
preference for permanent legislation, in situations where temporary legislation is more 
justified, there would be no such preference.  Specifically, in situations where legislators 
face temporary challenges and need to enact tax expenditures that are specifically 
designed to apply for a finite period of time, the more onerous mandatory scoring rule 
would be waived.  In these situations, temporary provisions would actually have an 
advantage because they would have more favorable budget scoring than their permanent 
counterparts and would require fewer available revenue offsets. 
To the extent that current budget preferences in favor of temporary provisions are 
reduced or neutralized, perhaps only tax expenditures which are purposely and 
appropriately temporary in nature will remain so.  No longer being crowded out in the 
renewal process by scores of other expiring provisions, more deliberative action and 
reflection could be taken with respect to their implementation.  With over fifty currently 
expired tax extenders waiting in legislative limbo, it is hard to imagine that due 
consideration will be given to each one.  Moreover, even with respect to permanent tax 
provisions, more opportunities for reevaluation and oversight would exist because of the 
proposed mandatory baseline review.  If a provision is becoming significantly more 
costly than originally anticipated, lawmakers will be forced to examine the source of the 
increased cost and find ways to either generate more revenues or scale back the benefits 
provided under the existing legislation. 
3. Enhance Legislative Stability 
To the extent fewer tax expenditures are enacted in temporary form and are 
instead enacted as permanent provisions, this would lead to greater legislative stability.  
                                               
142 As discussed above, if the tax expenditure in legislative Option B was merely extended every 
two years, lawmakers could always find offsets for the renewed legislation (as illustrated in Option C) by 
finding revenue raisers in the latter years of the then-applicable budget window (e.g. Option F).  If they did 
this, then only $5 billion of revenue offsets would have to be generated during the first ten fiscal years, even 
if the tax expenditure was in effect throughout the entire period. 
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As discussed above, taxpayers have a really difficult time planning their behavior and 
transactions around legislation that is constantly either in legislative jeopardy or limbo.
143
  
This undermines the efficacy of the enacted tax provision, and creates an inefficient and 
unstable legislative environment.  At the beginning of the 2014-2015 school year, 
teachers had to purchase school supplies for their classrooms without knowing whether 
there would be a retroactive extension of the educator expense deduction.
144
  Even if the 
deduction is ultimately extended retroactively, teachers may have already spent less than 
they otherwise would have on supplies for their students if they knew there would be a 
deduction available to offset their costs.
145
   
Further complications exist for business where interim reporting and forecasting 
requires firms to make determinations about their current and projected financial 
positions.
146
  As discussed above with respect to the R&D credit, money, and 
opportunities can be lost and company valuations can be skewed when important tax 
provisions are subjected to the legislative merry-go-round caused by the continuous cycle 
of expiring and renewing tax provisions.  These types of real world consequences can be 
mitigated to the extent that more permanent legislation is put in place.  By removing the 
preference for temporary tax expenditures in the budget process, more tax legislation may 
be enacted without sunsets, providing more legislative stability. 
4. Achieve Greater Political Transparency 
The proposed rules would also enhance political transparency.  The budget rules 
would make it more difficult for lawmakers to obscure the full costs of their proposed 
legislation by artificially sunsetting provisions. Scoring tax legislation for a ten-year 
period does not fully reflect the true cost of a proposed expenditure because it does not 
take into account the costs projected outside of the budget window.  However, it provides 
a much clearer reflection of the overall fiscal burden than is portrayed by breaking up the 
projected outlays into smaller one- or two-year pieces that are more easily digested by the 
general public.  Moreover, by requiring the temporary challenge designation in order to 
overcome the presumptive full budget window scoring requirement, lawmakers would 
have to reveal to the public the underlying expected duration of the proposed tax 
provision at the outset. 
In addition, by conforming the scoring for tax expenditures to the scoring 
requirements for mandatory spending programs, one of the built-in preferences for using 
the tax code to achieve government spending would be removed.  This could lead to more 
federal spending being proposed and administered through mandatory spending 
programs.  As discussed above, federal spending through the IRC is often less salient to 
the general public.
147
  Taking spending programs out of the tax system that do not 
naturally belong there (but may be there only because of the budgetary advantages 
afforded tax expenditures), could enhance political transparency with respect to federal 
spending. 
5. Diminish Captivity to Special Interest 
                                               
143 See supra discussion in Part III.D. 
144 To the extent the provision is intended to encourage teachers to fill in supply gaps that are not 
covered by their respective schools, the deduction may underachieve its purpose. 
145 See supra notes 106 and 107 and accompanying text. 
146 Harpaz, supra note 112. 
147 See supra notes 98 through 100 and accompanying text. 
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Lastly, these proposed rules would help diminish the ability of lawmakers to 
extract rents from special interest groups.   Under the present system, politicians are able 
to predictably extract rents from interest groups benefiting from targeted tax provisions 
that are perpetually under the threat of expiration.
148
  It is true that these same groups 
surely would have an interest in securing the passage of favorable permanent legislation 
and would presumably be willing to pay more for that privilege (including payments to 
ensure that the favorable provisions would not subsequently be repealed).  However, it is 
arguably reasonable to assume that over time the ability to extract rents with perpetual 
temporary legislation is greater than that with respect to equivalent permanent 
legislation.
149
  More opportunities to bargain with an industry’s legislative future can lead 
to greater opportunities to extract rents. 
C. Potential Criticisms 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of the proposed budget framework rules, 
there are some potential concerns with and criticisms of the proposal.  First, because of 
the endogenous nature of the budget rules, there is always the legitimate concern that 
Congress will choose not to follow them.  Statutory budget rules have the peculiar status 
of not being binding on Congress, even though they are duly passed and signed into 
law.
150
  They are instead given the same status as internally adopted Congressional 
budget rules.
151
  As such, either the House of Representatives or the Senate may at any 
time modify or waive the application of internal procedural rules.
152
  Nevertheless, the 
budget rules are still believed to have some effect as precommitment devices and in fact 
affect legislative outcomes.
153
  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the proposed 
modifications to the existing budget rules will affect the legislative budget process as 
well. 
Another potential criticism of the proposed budgetary framework is that it is a 
second-best solution to universal tax reform.  Tax reform would be the ideal way to deal 
with many of the underlying issues with the budget process and would help stabilize, at 
least temporarily, the tax laws.  However, the likelihood of a complete overhaul of the tax 
code happening in the near future is unclear at best.
154
  Even if the tax laws were 
completely updated, that solution by itself is also incomplete.  Inevitably, new tax 
                                               
148 See supra discussion in Part III.B. 
149 Kysar, supra note 3, at 1020.  But see Yin, supra note 5, at 244 (arguing that even if “a credible 
threat could be made relatively costlessly through, for example, the mere sponsorship of a bill or issuance of 
a press release, it is not clear why legislators would prefer to threaten temporary, as opposed to permanent, 
action. The latter would presumably present a more harmful outcome to the interested groups and therefore 
should generate greater returns to forestall the threatened action.”). 
150 The Supreme Court has given special deference to these Congressional framework rules due to 
concerns about separation of powers and the Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution.  Kysar, supra note 3, at 
1022. 
151 Id. 
152 In fact, when Senator Byrd proposed his amendment (the Byrd Rule) to the Budget Act in order 
to impose restraint on the Senate’s growing practice of adding extraneous items to reconciliation bills, it was 
approved by a vote of 96-0.  Michael W. Evans, The Budget Process and the “Sunset” Provision of the 2001 
Tax Law, 99 TAX NOTES 405, 409 (Apr. 21, 2003), citing 131 CONG. REC. 28974 (Oct. 24, 1985).  Not only 
did Senators overwhelmingly decide to subject themselves to a precommitment device, but also since that 
time they have followed the letter of the rule (even though they have repeatedly used sunset legislation to 
undermine the purported spirit of the rule). See also Kleinbard, supra note 6, at 6-7.   
153  Id. at 6. 
154 Although there is always a seemingly growing push for tax reform, the Internal Revenue Code 
has not been overhauled since 1986. 
32 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.6:1 
expenditure provisions would be introduced and a firm procedural framework would still 
need to be in place in order to prevent the newly reformed tax laws from devolving back 
to their present state.  New rules would be subject to the same budgetary pressures that 
exist under the present law, and the proposed rules would help maintain any ground 
gained with a new tax regime. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The increased use of temporary tax expenditures by lawmakers has exposed 
defects in the underlying legislative budget rules.  Lawmakers are able to use 
combinations of sunsets, phase-ins, sliding budget windows, and baseline manipulations 
in order to diminish and obscure the true projected cost of their proposals.  Although 
Congress is ultimately left in the position of having to police itself in order to regain more 
fiscal restraint, by using strategically tailored precommitment devices, it may be able to 
achieve more sound legislative outcomes.  Indeed, implementation of more nuanced 
budget rules is necessary in order to better combat the countervailing pressures that 
lawmakers face from well organized special interest forces and to ensure that Congress is 
able to improve the country’s long-term fiscal health. 
